Padre Robert Griffin III responde a Rob ParkerJim Corbett, EE.UU. HOY SportsShare
Padre Robert Griffin III, dijo que no está dejando comentarios racistas de un comentarista de llegar a él.
Rob Parker ESPN causó un gran revuelo con sus comentarios el jueves en RGIII y raza.
RGIII padre dijo que los comentarios no eran racistas pero tenían la intención de causar un gran revuelo.
20:44 EST 13 de diciembre. 2012 - Ashburn, VA. -
Robert Griffin II dijo que no ofenderse con comentarios despectivos
raciales hechas por un primer comentarista de ESPN Tome jueves, porque
"no va a beneficiar" a nadie.
Temprano
en el día, durante el espectáculo, comentarista Rob Parker, quien es
negro, había puesto en duda la autenticidad Robert Griffin III,
preguntando: "¿Es un hermano, o es un hermano cornball?" Parker continuó sus críticas al mariscal de campo novato Washington Redskins:
"Él no es real. Bien, él es negro, especie de hace la cosa, pero no es realmente abajo con la causa", dijo Parker. "No
es uno de nosotros. Es una especie de negro, pero no es verdad, como el
tipo con el que quieres pasar el rato con él porque es libre para otra
cosa.
"Todos
sabemos que él tiene una novia blanco. Había toda esta charla acerca de
cómo él es un republicano ... Tiger Woods estaba como, 'yo tengo la
piel negro, pero no me llames negro'".
Griffin
II le dijo a USA TODAY Sports fue sorprendido por los comentarios, pero
no dispararía de nuevo la noche del jueves, a pesar de los comentarios
de Parker inició la blogosfera y provocó airadas respuestas de medios
sociales. A
los pocos minutos después de que su padre hablaba, Griffin III twitteó a
sus seguidores: "Estoy agradecido por muchas cosas en la vida y una de
esas cosas es su ayuda Gracias.".
ESPN
portavoz Mike Soltys dijo a Sports USA Today que los comentarios de
Parker "no eran adecuadas y estamos evaluando nuestros próximos pasos."
Griffin II dijo que sus próximos pasos fueron a despedir a los comentarios de Parker.
"Él tiene que definir lo que" uno de nosotros "es. Ese tipo tiene que definir eso", dijo. "Yo
no diría que es el racismo. Sólo quiero decir que algunas personas
ponen las cosas que hay sobre las personas para que puedan remover las
cosas.
"Robert
está en muy buena forma en que está, en la que necesita para llegar a
fin de buscar los objetivos que tiene en la vida ... así que no te
ofendas".
Durante su conferencia de prensa semanal miércoles, Griffin III, dijo que no quiere ser definido por la raza.
"Uno quiere ser definido por su ética de trabajo, la persona que eres, tu carácter, tu personalidad", dijo. "Yo soy un africano-americano en Estados Unidos. Pero no tiene que ser definida por eso".
Thursday, December 13, 2012
Sunday, August 5, 2012
¿Alcohol y GERD - aliento prueba problema?
Después de una noche particularmente festiva que incluía unos tragos en el encuentro de un amigo el invierno pasado, K. Renfrew, una ciudad de Nueva York residente que padece enfermedad por reflujo gastroesofágico, también conocido como GERD, fue superado con los síntomas de delator de la enfermedad. "Hubo mucha presión centrada en mi pecho", dice. "Se sentía como un ataque de ansiedad mezclado con un ataque al corazón". No es de extrañar: el Alcohol es uno de los mayores desencadenantes de GERD.
Con la temporada de fiesta a alta velocidad, los doctores dicen que hombres y mujeres que sufren de GERD también pueden ser en durante un período de ataques de acidez estomacal. Aunque no todas las personas con GERD tienen problemas con el alcohol, muchos hacen claramente. "Es muy individualizado," dice el Dr. Philip Jaffe, profesor asociado de medicina en el centro de salud de la Universidad de Connecticut.
¿Cómo el alcohol empeora GERD. GERD es una condición en la que copia los jugos ácidos que normalmente permanecen en el estómago hacia el esófago, dañando su forro y provocando una serie de síntomas, incluyendo dolor en el pecho, dolor de garganta y, más común, acidez estomacal. Una razón que los pacientes desarrollan GERD es porque el esfínter esofágico inferior, un grupo de músculos que separa el esófago, el estómago no funciona correctamente y no forma un sello hermético como debiera; luego son capaces se deslice a través de jugos gástricos. Incluso algunos sorbos de licor pueden causar el LES trabajar ineficientemente, convirtiendo a un partygoer feliz de una vez en un miserable invitado.
"El alcohol inmediatamente puede disminuir la presión del LES," dice el Dr. Kristine Krueger, profesor asociado de medicina y director médico del centro de salud digestiva en la Universidad de Louisville. "Hace
View the Original article
Con la temporada de fiesta a alta velocidad, los doctores dicen que hombres y mujeres que sufren de GERD también pueden ser en durante un período de ataques de acidez estomacal. Aunque no todas las personas con GERD tienen problemas con el alcohol, muchos hacen claramente. "Es muy individualizado," dice el Dr. Philip Jaffe, profesor asociado de medicina en el centro de salud de la Universidad de Connecticut.
¿Cómo el alcohol empeora GERD. GERD es una condición en la que copia los jugos ácidos que normalmente permanecen en el estómago hacia el esófago, dañando su forro y provocando una serie de síntomas, incluyendo dolor en el pecho, dolor de garganta y, más común, acidez estomacal. Una razón que los pacientes desarrollan GERD es porque el esfínter esofágico inferior, un grupo de músculos que separa el esófago, el estómago no funciona correctamente y no forma un sello hermético como debiera; luego son capaces se deslice a través de jugos gástricos. Incluso algunos sorbos de licor pueden causar el LES trabajar ineficientemente, convirtiendo a un partygoer feliz de una vez en un miserable invitado.
"El alcohol inmediatamente puede disminuir la presión del LES," dice el Dr. Kristine Krueger, profesor asociado de medicina y director médico del centro de salud digestiva en la Universidad de Louisville. "Hace
View the Original article
Saturday, August 4, 2012
New Jersey Draeger Protocol founding Lacking
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
September Term 2005
Docket No. 58,879
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
JANE H. CHUN, DARIA L.
DE CICCO, JAMES R. HAUSLER,
ANGEL MIRALDA, JEFFREY R.
WOOD, ANTHONY ANZANO, MEHMET
DEMIRELLI, RAJ DESIA,
JEFFREY LOCASTRO, PETER
LIEBERWIRTH, JEFFREY LING,
HUSSAIN NAWAZ, FREDERICK
OGBUTOR, PETER PIASECKI,
LARA SLATER, CHRISTOPHER
SALKOWITZ, ELINA TIRADO,
DAVID WALKER, DAVID WHITMAN
and JAIRO J. YATACO,
Defendants.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF REMAND COURT
On remand from the Supreme Court of New Jersey: December 14, 2005
Findings and Conclusions Submitted to Supreme Court: February 13, 2007
Jessica S. Oppenheim, Assistant Attorney General, Christine A. Hoffman, Deputy Attorney General, Stephen H. Monson, Deputy Attorney General and John A. Dell'Aquilo, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the State of New Jersey.
Samuel L. Sachs of the firm Sachs & Sachs appeared on behalf of Jeffrey R. Wood and James R. Hausler.
Matthew W. Reisig appeared on behalf of Christopher Salkowitz, Peter Lieberwirth, Raj Desai and Peter Piasecki.
John Menzel of the firm Moore & Menzel appeared on behalf of Anthony Anzano, David Whitman, David Walker, Hussain Nawaz and Jeffrey Ling.
Evan M. Levow of the firm Levow & Costello appeared on behalf of Jane H. Chun, Lara Slater, Elina Tirado, and Frederick Ogbutor.
Jonathan A. Kessous and Christopher G. Hewitt, co-counsel, of the firm Garces & Grabler appeared on behalf of Jairo Yataco and Angel Miralda.
Bartholomew Baffuto appeared on behalf of Daria L. DeCicco.
Arnold N. Fishman of the firm Fishman, Littlefield & Fishman appeared on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association.
Jeffrey E. Gold of the firm Gold & Laine appeared on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association.
Peter H. Lederman of the firm Lomurro Davison Eastman & Munoz appeared on behalf of amcius curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
KING, P.J.A.D., SPECIAL MASTER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. STANDARD OF PROOF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
III. THE FACTS
1. CHEMISTRY AND PHYSIOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2. HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3. THE INSTRUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
IV. EXPERT TESTIMONY
1. HANSUELI RYSER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2. THOMAS A. BRETTELL, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . 73
3. SGT. KEVIN M. FLANAGAN . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4. EDWARD CONDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5. ROD G. GULLBERG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6. SAMUEL E. CHAPPELL, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . 156
7. BARRY K. LOGAN, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . . . 162
8. J. ROBERT ZETTL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
9. PATRICK M. HARDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
10. NORMAN J. DEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
11. STEPHEN B. SEIDMAN, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . . 202
12. GERALD SIMPSON, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . . . 210
13. MICHAEL PETER HLASTLA, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . 219
V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. IN THE WAKE OF DOWNIE . . . . . . . . . . . 228
2. ADMINISTRATIVE SAFEGUARDS . . . . . . . . . . 238
3. SOURCE CODES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
4. RFI-EMI INTERFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
5. FOUNDATIONAL EVIDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . 250
6. BREATH VOLUME AND FLOW RATE . . . . . . . . 251
7. CENTRALIZED DATA MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . 253
8. NON-OPERATOR DEPENDENT . . . . . . . . . . 254
9. BREATH TEMPERATURE SENSOR . . . . . . . . . 255
10. TOLERANCES FOR THE TWO BREATH TESTS . . . . 256
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
APPENDIX A - TRANSCRIPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
APPENDIX B - BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. RECOMMENDED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
2. ANCILLARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The case arises from quasi-criminal actions involving twenty defendants who were arrested in Middlesex County for driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Defendants challenged the admissibility and reliability of breath test results obtained from the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C, firmware version NJ 3.11 (Alcotest 7110).
On October 14, 2005 the Law Division granted the State's motion to consolidate the cases pending as of May 23, 2005 in several Middlesex County municipal courts. Among other things, Judge Cantor denied the State's motion to take judicial notice of the opinion in State v. Foley, 370 N.J. Super. 341, 359 (Law Div. 2003), which ruled that the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C was scientifically accurate and reliable and that its reported readings would be admitted into evidence without the need for expert testimony. At the time of Foley, New Jersey was using firmware version 3.8.
In her written statement of November 10, 2005 Judge Cantor explained that the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C was a new instrument adopted throughout New Jersey on a county-by-county basis on a sequential timetable. She emphasized that only the Camden County, Law Division in Foley had found it scientifically reliable and that Judge Orlando, in dictum, had concluded that New Jersey should make certain changes in the instrument's firmware and the instructions given to its users. Ibid. Because the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C was a novel scientific instrument which had never been vetted by an appellate court or our Supreme Court, Judge Cantor concluded that its scientific reliability remained a justiciable issue.
On December 1, 2005 the Appellate Division granted the State's motion for leave to appeal and denied its motion for a summary reversal. The Appellate Division remanded the matter to the trial court for an accelerated hearing on the validity of breath tests for alcohol, obtained through the use of Alcotest instruments.
On December 14, 2005 our Supreme Court certified the appeal pending in the Appellate Division on its own motion pursuant to R. 2:12-1. The Court vacated the remand to the Law Division and remanded the matter to retired Appellate Division Judge Michael Patrick King, to preside as a Special Master. The Court ordered the Special Master to conduct a hearing and report his findings and conclusions on an accelerated basis.
The Court ordered the Special Master to:
1. Conduct a plenary hearing on the reliability of Alcotest breath test instruments, including consideration of the pertinent portions of the record in State v. Foley, 370 N.J. Super. 341 (Law Div. 2003), and the within matters in the Superior Court, Law Division, Middlesex County, together with such additional expert testimony and arguments as may be presented by the parties;
2. Determine whether the testimony presented by the parties should be supplemented by that of independent experts selected by the Special Master;
3. Grant, in the Special Master's discretion, motions by appropriate entities seeking to participate as amici curiae, said motions to be filed with the Special Master within ten days of the filing date of this Order;
4. Invite, in the Special Master's discretion, the participation of entities or persons as amici curiae or, to the extent necessary in the interests of justice, as intervenors to assist the Special Master in the resolution of the issues before him; and
5. Within thirty days of the completion of the plenary hearing, file findings and conclusions with the Clerk of the Court and contemporaneously serve a copy on the parties and amici curiae, which service may be effectuated by the posting of the report on the Judiciary's website . . . .
The Court also ordered the parties, and permitted all amici curiae who participated in the plenary hearing, to serve and file initial briefs within fourteen days of the filing of the Special Master's report as well as responses, if any, within ten days. It further ordered the Clerk to set the matter for oral argument on the first available date after completion of briefing by the parties. Finally, the Court ordered the stay of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 proceedings pending in Middlesex County, and directed all Superior and Municipal Court judges before whom such proceedings were pending, to ensure strict enforcement of the Court's Guidelines for Operation of Plea Agreements in the Municipal Courts of New Jersey.
On January 9, 2006 the Special Master granted to the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) leave to appear as amicus curiae. On January 23, 2006 the Special Master also admitted the New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA) as amicus curiae, under R. 1:13-9, in view of the matter's public importance.
On January 10, 2006 the Court sua sponte issued an order addressing issues that affected the prosecution of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 offenses statewide. The Court ordered all prosecutions and appeals which did not involve the Alcotest 7110 to proceed in the normal course. The Court, however, ordered the stay of prosecutions and appeals involving repeat offenders and the execution of their sentences where the convictions were based solely on Alcotest readings. The Court also ordered that first-offender prosecutions proceed to trial based on clinical evidence when available and on Alcotest readings. It ordered, however, that the execution of sentences for all first offenders be stayed pending disposition of the Court's final decision on the Alcotest 7110's reliability, unless public interest required their immediate implementation.
As explained by the Administrative Director, Judge Carchman, in a clarifying memorandum to municipal court judges dated January 17, 2006, a court could admit evidence of an Alcotest reading, over the objection of defense counsel, without first holding a hearing on the instrument's scientific reliability. He further explained that under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(2) and (3), the penalty for repeat offenders was the same whether the finding of guilt was based on observation or blood alcohol levels. However, for first offenders, the penalty could vary, making the Alcotest reliability hearing of fundamental importance.
On March 15, 2006 the Court entered an order directing the Special Master to designate an independent expert or experts. Upon deliberation and consultation with the parties and amici curiae, the Special Master determined that a court-appointed expert was not necessary for proof purposes, especially because of the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings.
Meanwhile, discovery proceeded. On February 3, 2006 the Special Master entered an order directing the State to give defendants certain information, documents and materials pertaining to the Alcotest 7110's firmware, software, algorithms, electronic schematics, and source codes. Among other things, the discovery order recognized that the exchange of firmware and software might require a protective order to be submitted by the State or manufacturer for court approval. On February 17, 2006 the Special Master entered a supplemental discovery order directing the State to lend three Alcotest 7110s to defense counsel and one to counsel for the amicus NJSBA. Among other things, the supplemental discovery order also allowed the manufacturer Draeger Safety Diagnostics, Inc. (Draeger) to apply to intervene in this matter, especially because of the issue of "trade secrets."
Draeger objected to the discovery orders claiming that they permitted the release of trade secrets and proprietary information. On February 23, 2006 Draeger's intellectual property counsel prepared a proposed protective order and sent it to the State for submission to the court. Draeger's proposal included a request for indemnification from defense counsel. In response to defendants' objections to Draeger's initial draft ¾ especially to the request for indemnity ¾ and a revised proposal by the State, the Special Master requested defense counsel to submit a proposed protective order.
Draeger then offered to make copies of the Alcotest 7110's source codes available to the Special Master and explain them to him during an in camera session provided there would be no testimonial record and the data would be returned after his inspection and decision. Again, defense counsel objected, explaining that the purpose of requesting the source codes and algorithms was to allow their expert to review and test them.
On April 19, 2006 defendants submitted their proposed protective order. In anticipation of a court-issued protective order, the State provided to defense counsel and the amicus the four Alcotest 7110 instruments for their inspection.
On April 26, 2006 the Special Master entered a protective order which required all discovery information in which Draeger asserted an intellectual property right so marked. With regard to the marked discovery, the protective order required: (1) that the information could not be disclosed by parties or amici curiae, or by consultants and experts given access to it; and (2) that the information must be returned to Draeger following the conclusion of all litigation. The protective order also extended its terms and restrictions for three years from the termination of litigation or until such time as the marked discovery information entered the public domain, whichever came first, and stated that the violation or breach of any condition would be grounds for court contempt action, civil damages or other appropriate sanctions after a hearing where the accused would be afforded due process under R. 1:10. Additionally, if Draeger did not cooperate with discovery, the protective order allowed the Special Master to draw any appropriate negative inferences in his decision on the Alcotest 7110's reliability. The protective order did not include an indemnification provision.
Shortly after, on April 28, 2006, the State submitted comments on its revised proposed protective order. In part, the State explained that the indemnification provision would require those defendants who received the instruments to indemnify and hold harmless the State from any damage that might result from the firmware's use or installation.
On May 15, 2006 Draeger wrote to the State with its objections noting that it would not cooperate with discovery unless the court entered a "satisfactory" protective order. On May 22, 2006, after consideration of Draeger's expressed objections, the Special Master amended the protective order by: further limiting access to the information disclosed; extending the term and restrictions from three years to as long as the marked discovery information remained a trade secret or until it entered the public domain; and providing that other sanctions might be appropriate in cases where Draeger demonstrated at a hearing that it would suffer irreparable harm and there was no adequate remedy at law.
On June 15, 2006 Draeger wrote again to the State indicating that the amended protective order was an "improvement" but still did not provide adequate protection. Draeger continued to insist that the Special Master adopt an order substantially similar to its initial proposal. For example, Draeger contended: it should be provided with the identity of experts who would be given the marked information in discovery; it should not have to appear before the Special Master at a hearing to demonstrate irreparable harm; it should be allowed to demonstrate its intellectual property rights or prove its need for injunctive relief in a forum other than before Judge King; and it should not be forced to comply with an order essentially based upon a proposal by defendants who did not have any trade secrets or proprietary information to be protected.
Draeger also advised the Special Master and the State that it "recently" had adopted a "new policy" regarding confidential disclosure of the Alcotest 7110's source codes and other trade secrets to those individuals ¾ including parties involved in the Chun litigation ¾ who accepted the following conditions: (1) individuals who agreed to sign appropriate non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements prepared by Draeger; (2) individuals who agreed to review the information in a room at Draeger's offices in Durango, Colorado; (3) individuals who agreed to allow a Draeger representative to be present in the room when they reviewed the information; and (4) individuals who agreed not to take photographs, make copies by writing or other means, or make any recordings of the information. To maintain its "non-party status," Draeger again declined the Special Master's offer to meet with him or participate in any conferences. Incidentally, Draeger has no United States or foreign patent protection on the Alcotest 7110.
Neither the State nor defendants expressed any interest in complying with Draeger's fastidious conditions on the source codes' disclosure. The Special Master also declined to further amend the protective order. Consequently, discovery and the exchange of documents and expert reports proceeded without Draeger's participation. This created an anomalous situation: the manufacturer was not a party to the defense of its product. The State had to defend the Alcotest 7110 derivately.
Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104, the Special Master held forty-one full days of evidentiary hearings which commenced on September 18, 2006 and concluded on January 10, 2007. The parties and amicus NJSBA submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the scientific reliability of the Alcotest 7110. As further ordered by the Court, the Special Master has issued his findings and conclusions in this matter within thirty days of the completion of the hearings.
II. STANDARD OF PROOF
The key issue is whether the Alcotest 7110 is a scientifically reliable instrument for determining the alcohol content of the breath and blood. The resolution of this question will assist the Supreme Court in determining whether the results of Alcotest 7110 readings generally may be admitted in evidence and support convictions under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 and cognate statutes.
Under New Jersey's statutory scheme, a driver of a motor vehicle is guilty of a so-called "per se" violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) at a "blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood." Thus, New Jersey is a "blood" alcohol jurisdiction as opposed to a "breath" alcohol jurisdiction. See State v. Downie, 117 N.J. 450, 469-71 (1990) (Stein, J., dissenting). A person "under the legal age
View the Original article
September Term 2005
Docket No. 58,879
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
JANE H. CHUN, DARIA L.
DE CICCO, JAMES R. HAUSLER,
ANGEL MIRALDA, JEFFREY R.
WOOD, ANTHONY ANZANO, MEHMET
DEMIRELLI, RAJ DESIA,
JEFFREY LOCASTRO, PETER
LIEBERWIRTH, JEFFREY LING,
HUSSAIN NAWAZ, FREDERICK
OGBUTOR, PETER PIASECKI,
LARA SLATER, CHRISTOPHER
SALKOWITZ, ELINA TIRADO,
DAVID WALKER, DAVID WHITMAN
and JAIRO J. YATACO,
Defendants.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF REMAND COURT
On remand from the Supreme Court of New Jersey: December 14, 2005
Findings and Conclusions Submitted to Supreme Court: February 13, 2007
Jessica S. Oppenheim, Assistant Attorney General, Christine A. Hoffman, Deputy Attorney General, Stephen H. Monson, Deputy Attorney General and John A. Dell'Aquilo, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the State of New Jersey.
Samuel L. Sachs of the firm Sachs & Sachs appeared on behalf of Jeffrey R. Wood and James R. Hausler.
Matthew W. Reisig appeared on behalf of Christopher Salkowitz, Peter Lieberwirth, Raj Desai and Peter Piasecki.
John Menzel of the firm Moore & Menzel appeared on behalf of Anthony Anzano, David Whitman, David Walker, Hussain Nawaz and Jeffrey Ling.
Evan M. Levow of the firm Levow & Costello appeared on behalf of Jane H. Chun, Lara Slater, Elina Tirado, and Frederick Ogbutor.
Jonathan A. Kessous and Christopher G. Hewitt, co-counsel, of the firm Garces & Grabler appeared on behalf of Jairo Yataco and Angel Miralda.
Bartholomew Baffuto appeared on behalf of Daria L. DeCicco.
Arnold N. Fishman of the firm Fishman, Littlefield & Fishman appeared on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association.
Jeffrey E. Gold of the firm Gold & Laine appeared on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association.
Peter H. Lederman of the firm Lomurro Davison Eastman & Munoz appeared on behalf of amcius curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
KING, P.J.A.D., SPECIAL MASTER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. STANDARD OF PROOF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
III. THE FACTS
1. CHEMISTRY AND PHYSIOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2. HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3. THE INSTRUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
IV. EXPERT TESTIMONY
1. HANSUELI RYSER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2. THOMAS A. BRETTELL, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . 73
3. SGT. KEVIN M. FLANAGAN . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4. EDWARD CONDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5. ROD G. GULLBERG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6. SAMUEL E. CHAPPELL, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . 156
7. BARRY K. LOGAN, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . . . 162
8. J. ROBERT ZETTL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
9. PATRICK M. HARDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
10. NORMAN J. DEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
11. STEPHEN B. SEIDMAN, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . . 202
12. GERALD SIMPSON, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . . . . 210
13. MICHAEL PETER HLASTLA, Ph.D. . . . . . . . . 219
V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. IN THE WAKE OF DOWNIE . . . . . . . . . . . 228
2. ADMINISTRATIVE SAFEGUARDS . . . . . . . . . . 238
3. SOURCE CODES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
4. RFI-EMI INTERFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
5. FOUNDATIONAL EVIDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . 250
6. BREATH VOLUME AND FLOW RATE . . . . . . . . 251
7. CENTRALIZED DATA MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . 253
8. NON-OPERATOR DEPENDENT . . . . . . . . . . 254
9. BREATH TEMPERATURE SENSOR . . . . . . . . . 255
10. TOLERANCES FOR THE TWO BREATH TESTS . . . . 256
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
APPENDIX A - TRANSCRIPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
APPENDIX B - BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. RECOMMENDED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
2. ANCILLARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The case arises from quasi-criminal actions involving twenty defendants who were arrested in Middlesex County for driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Defendants challenged the admissibility and reliability of breath test results obtained from the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C, firmware version NJ 3.11 (Alcotest 7110).
On October 14, 2005 the Law Division granted the State's motion to consolidate the cases pending as of May 23, 2005 in several Middlesex County municipal courts. Among other things, Judge Cantor denied the State's motion to take judicial notice of the opinion in State v. Foley, 370 N.J. Super. 341, 359 (Law Div. 2003), which ruled that the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C was scientifically accurate and reliable and that its reported readings would be admitted into evidence without the need for expert testimony. At the time of Foley, New Jersey was using firmware version 3.8.
In her written statement of November 10, 2005 Judge Cantor explained that the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C was a new instrument adopted throughout New Jersey on a county-by-county basis on a sequential timetable. She emphasized that only the Camden County, Law Division in Foley had found it scientifically reliable and that Judge Orlando, in dictum, had concluded that New Jersey should make certain changes in the instrument's firmware and the instructions given to its users. Ibid. Because the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C was a novel scientific instrument which had never been vetted by an appellate court or our Supreme Court, Judge Cantor concluded that its scientific reliability remained a justiciable issue.
On December 1, 2005 the Appellate Division granted the State's motion for leave to appeal and denied its motion for a summary reversal. The Appellate Division remanded the matter to the trial court for an accelerated hearing on the validity of breath tests for alcohol, obtained through the use of Alcotest instruments.
On December 14, 2005 our Supreme Court certified the appeal pending in the Appellate Division on its own motion pursuant to R. 2:12-1. The Court vacated the remand to the Law Division and remanded the matter to retired Appellate Division Judge Michael Patrick King, to preside as a Special Master. The Court ordered the Special Master to conduct a hearing and report his findings and conclusions on an accelerated basis.
The Court ordered the Special Master to:
1. Conduct a plenary hearing on the reliability of Alcotest breath test instruments, including consideration of the pertinent portions of the record in State v. Foley, 370 N.J. Super. 341 (Law Div. 2003), and the within matters in the Superior Court, Law Division, Middlesex County, together with such additional expert testimony and arguments as may be presented by the parties;
2. Determine whether the testimony presented by the parties should be supplemented by that of independent experts selected by the Special Master;
3. Grant, in the Special Master's discretion, motions by appropriate entities seeking to participate as amici curiae, said motions to be filed with the Special Master within ten days of the filing date of this Order;
4. Invite, in the Special Master's discretion, the participation of entities or persons as amici curiae or, to the extent necessary in the interests of justice, as intervenors to assist the Special Master in the resolution of the issues before him; and
5. Within thirty days of the completion of the plenary hearing, file findings and conclusions with the Clerk of the Court and contemporaneously serve a copy on the parties and amici curiae, which service may be effectuated by the posting of the report on the Judiciary's website . . . .
The Court also ordered the parties, and permitted all amici curiae who participated in the plenary hearing, to serve and file initial briefs within fourteen days of the filing of the Special Master's report as well as responses, if any, within ten days. It further ordered the Clerk to set the matter for oral argument on the first available date after completion of briefing by the parties. Finally, the Court ordered the stay of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 proceedings pending in Middlesex County, and directed all Superior and Municipal Court judges before whom such proceedings were pending, to ensure strict enforcement of the Court's Guidelines for Operation of Plea Agreements in the Municipal Courts of New Jersey.
On January 9, 2006 the Special Master granted to the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) leave to appear as amicus curiae. On January 23, 2006 the Special Master also admitted the New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA) as amicus curiae, under R. 1:13-9, in view of the matter's public importance.
On January 10, 2006 the Court sua sponte issued an order addressing issues that affected the prosecution of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 offenses statewide. The Court ordered all prosecutions and appeals which did not involve the Alcotest 7110 to proceed in the normal course. The Court, however, ordered the stay of prosecutions and appeals involving repeat offenders and the execution of their sentences where the convictions were based solely on Alcotest readings. The Court also ordered that first-offender prosecutions proceed to trial based on clinical evidence when available and on Alcotest readings. It ordered, however, that the execution of sentences for all first offenders be stayed pending disposition of the Court's final decision on the Alcotest 7110's reliability, unless public interest required their immediate implementation.
As explained by the Administrative Director, Judge Carchman, in a clarifying memorandum to municipal court judges dated January 17, 2006, a court could admit evidence of an Alcotest reading, over the objection of defense counsel, without first holding a hearing on the instrument's scientific reliability. He further explained that under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(2) and (3), the penalty for repeat offenders was the same whether the finding of guilt was based on observation or blood alcohol levels. However, for first offenders, the penalty could vary, making the Alcotest reliability hearing of fundamental importance.
On March 15, 2006 the Court entered an order directing the Special Master to designate an independent expert or experts. Upon deliberation and consultation with the parties and amici curiae, the Special Master determined that a court-appointed expert was not necessary for proof purposes, especially because of the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings.
Meanwhile, discovery proceeded. On February 3, 2006 the Special Master entered an order directing the State to give defendants certain information, documents and materials pertaining to the Alcotest 7110's firmware, software, algorithms, electronic schematics, and source codes. Among other things, the discovery order recognized that the exchange of firmware and software might require a protective order to be submitted by the State or manufacturer for court approval. On February 17, 2006 the Special Master entered a supplemental discovery order directing the State to lend three Alcotest 7110s to defense counsel and one to counsel for the amicus NJSBA. Among other things, the supplemental discovery order also allowed the manufacturer Draeger Safety Diagnostics, Inc. (Draeger) to apply to intervene in this matter, especially because of the issue of "trade secrets."
Draeger objected to the discovery orders claiming that they permitted the release of trade secrets and proprietary information. On February 23, 2006 Draeger's intellectual property counsel prepared a proposed protective order and sent it to the State for submission to the court. Draeger's proposal included a request for indemnification from defense counsel. In response to defendants' objections to Draeger's initial draft ¾ especially to the request for indemnity ¾ and a revised proposal by the State, the Special Master requested defense counsel to submit a proposed protective order.
Draeger then offered to make copies of the Alcotest 7110's source codes available to the Special Master and explain them to him during an in camera session provided there would be no testimonial record and the data would be returned after his inspection and decision. Again, defense counsel objected, explaining that the purpose of requesting the source codes and algorithms was to allow their expert to review and test them.
On April 19, 2006 defendants submitted their proposed protective order. In anticipation of a court-issued protective order, the State provided to defense counsel and the amicus the four Alcotest 7110 instruments for their inspection.
On April 26, 2006 the Special Master entered a protective order which required all discovery information in which Draeger asserted an intellectual property right so marked. With regard to the marked discovery, the protective order required: (1) that the information could not be disclosed by parties or amici curiae, or by consultants and experts given access to it; and (2) that the information must be returned to Draeger following the conclusion of all litigation. The protective order also extended its terms and restrictions for three years from the termination of litigation or until such time as the marked discovery information entered the public domain, whichever came first, and stated that the violation or breach of any condition would be grounds for court contempt action, civil damages or other appropriate sanctions after a hearing where the accused would be afforded due process under R. 1:10. Additionally, if Draeger did not cooperate with discovery, the protective order allowed the Special Master to draw any appropriate negative inferences in his decision on the Alcotest 7110's reliability. The protective order did not include an indemnification provision.
Shortly after, on April 28, 2006, the State submitted comments on its revised proposed protective order. In part, the State explained that the indemnification provision would require those defendants who received the instruments to indemnify and hold harmless the State from any damage that might result from the firmware's use or installation.
On May 15, 2006 Draeger wrote to the State with its objections noting that it would not cooperate with discovery unless the court entered a "satisfactory" protective order. On May 22, 2006, after consideration of Draeger's expressed objections, the Special Master amended the protective order by: further limiting access to the information disclosed; extending the term and restrictions from three years to as long as the marked discovery information remained a trade secret or until it entered the public domain; and providing that other sanctions might be appropriate in cases where Draeger demonstrated at a hearing that it would suffer irreparable harm and there was no adequate remedy at law.
On June 15, 2006 Draeger wrote again to the State indicating that the amended protective order was an "improvement" but still did not provide adequate protection. Draeger continued to insist that the Special Master adopt an order substantially similar to its initial proposal. For example, Draeger contended: it should be provided with the identity of experts who would be given the marked information in discovery; it should not have to appear before the Special Master at a hearing to demonstrate irreparable harm; it should be allowed to demonstrate its intellectual property rights or prove its need for injunctive relief in a forum other than before Judge King; and it should not be forced to comply with an order essentially based upon a proposal by defendants who did not have any trade secrets or proprietary information to be protected.
Draeger also advised the Special Master and the State that it "recently" had adopted a "new policy" regarding confidential disclosure of the Alcotest 7110's source codes and other trade secrets to those individuals ¾ including parties involved in the Chun litigation ¾ who accepted the following conditions: (1) individuals who agreed to sign appropriate non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements prepared by Draeger; (2) individuals who agreed to review the information in a room at Draeger's offices in Durango, Colorado; (3) individuals who agreed to allow a Draeger representative to be present in the room when they reviewed the information; and (4) individuals who agreed not to take photographs, make copies by writing or other means, or make any recordings of the information. To maintain its "non-party status," Draeger again declined the Special Master's offer to meet with him or participate in any conferences. Incidentally, Draeger has no United States or foreign patent protection on the Alcotest 7110.
Neither the State nor defendants expressed any interest in complying with Draeger's fastidious conditions on the source codes' disclosure. The Special Master also declined to further amend the protective order. Consequently, discovery and the exchange of documents and expert reports proceeded without Draeger's participation. This created an anomalous situation: the manufacturer was not a party to the defense of its product. The State had to defend the Alcotest 7110 derivately.
Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104, the Special Master held forty-one full days of evidentiary hearings which commenced on September 18, 2006 and concluded on January 10, 2007. The parties and amicus NJSBA submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the scientific reliability of the Alcotest 7110. As further ordered by the Court, the Special Master has issued his findings and conclusions in this matter within thirty days of the completion of the hearings.
II. STANDARD OF PROOF
The key issue is whether the Alcotest 7110 is a scientifically reliable instrument for determining the alcohol content of the breath and blood. The resolution of this question will assist the Supreme Court in determining whether the results of Alcotest 7110 readings generally may be admitted in evidence and support convictions under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 and cognate statutes.
Under New Jersey's statutory scheme, a driver of a motor vehicle is guilty of a so-called "per se" violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) at a "blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood." Thus, New Jersey is a "blood" alcohol jurisdiction as opposed to a "breath" alcohol jurisdiction. See State v. Downie, 117 N.J. 450, 469-71 (1990) (Stein, J., dissenting). A person "under the legal age
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Friday, August 3, 2012
DIABÉTICOS Y PRUEBAS DE CAMPO DE DUI
Diabéticos experimentan comúnmente hipoglucemia (niveles de azúcar en la sangre baja). Y ¿cuáles son los síntomas? Lento y manchados de discurso, pobre equilibrio, con problemas de control del motor, asombrosas, somnolencia, lavado de cara, desorientación--en otras palabras, los síntomas clásicos de intoxicación por alcohol. Este individuo será mirar y actuar como un conductor ebrio al oficial y seguramente fallará cualquier DUI "pruebas de sobriedad de campo". Como ha observado un experto, "hipoglucemia (niveles anormalmente bajos de glucosa en la sangre) es frecuente en relación con la conducción de error en esta nación caminos y carreteras...Aún más frecuentes son injustificadas DUIs o DWIs, derivadas de los síntomas hipoglicémicos que estrechamente pueden parecerse a los de un conductor ebrio". De "hipoglucemia: conducir bajo la influencia" en 8.1 revisión de información médica y toxicológica septiembre de 2003.
Científicos canadienses han informado que "aproximadamente 200 compuestos han sido detectados en la respiración humana". Manolis, el potencial diagnóstico de análisis de aliento, 29 química clínica 5 (1983).
Este estudio confirmó la presencia de acetona en el aliento en diabéticos y en personas con una dieta "asociado con una reducción de peso de cerca de media libra por semana". ID. en 9. Otro estudio ha confirmado que los diabéticos pueden dar indicaciones falsas de intoxicación. Ladrillo, Diabetes, aliento acetona y precisión de alcoholemia: A Case Study, 9.1 Alcohol, drogas y conducción (1993), un investigador encontró que cetonas caducadas en el aliento de un diabético no tratada pueden contribuir a lecturas erróneamente alto de alcohol de aliento. Además, la acetona en el aliento de cetoacidosis dará como resultado un olor de alcohol. Por último, patrones de conducta de un diabético cuyo nivel de azúcar en la sangre ha caído incluirá pronunciación, marcha lenta, con problemas de control del motor, empleados movimientos de la mano y confusión mental--todos los síntoma de intoxicación.
También se puede encontrar la acetona en el aliento de individuos perfectamente normales y sanas. Sin embargo, la acetona es uno de los compuestos que se detectarán el aliento de muchos análisis de instrumentos como el etanol. Por ejemplo, en el Intoxilyzer, se detecta porque acetona absorbe energía infrarroja en el rango de 3,38 a 3,40 micras--el mismo rango donde se encuentra el etanol. Por lo tanto, si la acetona se introdujeron en el Intoxilyzer, la máquina simplemente podría registrar la presencia de alcohol a pesar de su ausencia. Si un individuo tuvo 525 microgramos por litro de acetona en el aliento, él podría registrar un nivel de alcohol en sangre de.02.03 por ciento. Así, si un individuo con un nivel de alcohol en sangre verdadera de.08 por ciento tenía esa cantidad de acetona, el Intoxilyzer registraran en el área de .l0 al 11 por ciento.
La National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ha publicado un informe titulado la probabilidad de acetona interferencias en la medición de Alcohol de aliento (DOT HS--806-922). El informe resume básicamente la literatura científica sobre el tema, concluyendo que los individuos normales tienen niveles insignificantes de acetona en su aliento. Sin embargo, los datos indicados, que personas pueden tener niveles más altos y que los diabéticos no en control de su azúcar en la sangre tenían niveles de cientos o incluso miles de veces superiores a la normal
un estudio confirma los efectos de la acetona en diabéticos puede encontrarse en Mormann, Olsen, Sakshaug y Morland, medición de etanol por el analizador de aliento de Alkomat; Especificidad química y la influencia de la función pulmonar, la técnica de respiración y la temperatura ambiente, 25 Blutalkohol 153 (1988). Sujetos diabéticos en ese estudio también se encontraron niveles de acetona, suficientes para producir lecturas de alcohol de aliento de.06 por ciento.
Máquinas de pruebas de aliento, como el Intoxilyzer 5000, sufren de un defecto de diseño poco conocido: no miden realmente alcohol! En su lugar, utilizan rayos infrarrojos de la luz que son absorbidos por cualquier compuesto químico (incluyendo alcohol etílico) en el aliento que contiene el "grupo de metilo" en su estructura molecular; la mayor absorción, mayor será el alcohol en sangre de lectura. La máquina está programada para asumir que el compuesto es "probablemente" de alcohol. Lamentablemente, miles de compuestos que contienen el grupo metilo pueden registrarse como alcohol. Uno de ellos es "acetona". Y un subproducto bien documentado de hipoglucemia es un estado llamado "cetoacidosis", que causa la producción de acetonas en el aliento. En otras palabras, el alcoholímetro leerá significativos niveles de alcohol en el aliento del diabético donde puede haber muy poco o nada. Véase, por ejemplo, ladrillo, "Diabetes, aliento acetona y precisión de alcoholemia: un estudio de caso", 9.1 Alcohol, drogas y conducción (1993).
Hecho: aproximadamente uno de cada siete sobrio choferes en las carreteras sufre de diabetes.Posted byAlabamaDUIDefense.comat8:53 AM
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Científicos canadienses han informado que "aproximadamente 200 compuestos han sido detectados en la respiración humana". Manolis, el potencial diagnóstico de análisis de aliento, 29 química clínica 5 (1983).
Este estudio confirmó la presencia de acetona en el aliento en diabéticos y en personas con una dieta "asociado con una reducción de peso de cerca de media libra por semana". ID. en 9. Otro estudio ha confirmado que los diabéticos pueden dar indicaciones falsas de intoxicación. Ladrillo, Diabetes, aliento acetona y precisión de alcoholemia: A Case Study, 9.1 Alcohol, drogas y conducción (1993), un investigador encontró que cetonas caducadas en el aliento de un diabético no tratada pueden contribuir a lecturas erróneamente alto de alcohol de aliento. Además, la acetona en el aliento de cetoacidosis dará como resultado un olor de alcohol. Por último, patrones de conducta de un diabético cuyo nivel de azúcar en la sangre ha caído incluirá pronunciación, marcha lenta, con problemas de control del motor, empleados movimientos de la mano y confusión mental--todos los síntoma de intoxicación.
También se puede encontrar la acetona en el aliento de individuos perfectamente normales y sanas. Sin embargo, la acetona es uno de los compuestos que se detectarán el aliento de muchos análisis de instrumentos como el etanol. Por ejemplo, en el Intoxilyzer, se detecta porque acetona absorbe energía infrarroja en el rango de 3,38 a 3,40 micras--el mismo rango donde se encuentra el etanol. Por lo tanto, si la acetona se introdujeron en el Intoxilyzer, la máquina simplemente podría registrar la presencia de alcohol a pesar de su ausencia. Si un individuo tuvo 525 microgramos por litro de acetona en el aliento, él podría registrar un nivel de alcohol en sangre de.02.03 por ciento. Así, si un individuo con un nivel de alcohol en sangre verdadera de.08 por ciento tenía esa cantidad de acetona, el Intoxilyzer registraran en el área de .l0 al 11 por ciento.
La National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ha publicado un informe titulado la probabilidad de acetona interferencias en la medición de Alcohol de aliento (DOT HS--806-922). El informe resume básicamente la literatura científica sobre el tema, concluyendo que los individuos normales tienen niveles insignificantes de acetona en su aliento. Sin embargo, los datos indicados, que personas pueden tener niveles más altos y que los diabéticos no en control de su azúcar en la sangre tenían niveles de cientos o incluso miles de veces superiores a la normal
un estudio confirma los efectos de la acetona en diabéticos puede encontrarse en Mormann, Olsen, Sakshaug y Morland, medición de etanol por el analizador de aliento de Alkomat; Especificidad química y la influencia de la función pulmonar, la técnica de respiración y la temperatura ambiente, 25 Blutalkohol 153 (1988). Sujetos diabéticos en ese estudio también se encontraron niveles de acetona, suficientes para producir lecturas de alcohol de aliento de.06 por ciento.
Máquinas de pruebas de aliento, como el Intoxilyzer 5000, sufren de un defecto de diseño poco conocido: no miden realmente alcohol! En su lugar, utilizan rayos infrarrojos de la luz que son absorbidos por cualquier compuesto químico (incluyendo alcohol etílico) en el aliento que contiene el "grupo de metilo" en su estructura molecular; la mayor absorción, mayor será el alcohol en sangre de lectura. La máquina está programada para asumir que el compuesto es "probablemente" de alcohol. Lamentablemente, miles de compuestos que contienen el grupo metilo pueden registrarse como alcohol. Uno de ellos es "acetona". Y un subproducto bien documentado de hipoglucemia es un estado llamado "cetoacidosis", que causa la producción de acetonas en el aliento. En otras palabras, el alcoholímetro leerá significativos niveles de alcohol en el aliento del diabético donde puede haber muy poco o nada. Véase, por ejemplo, ladrillo, "Diabetes, aliento acetona y precisión de alcoholemia: un estudio de caso", 9.1 Alcohol, drogas y conducción (1993).
Hecho: aproximadamente uno de cada siete sobrio choferes en las carreteras sufre de diabetes.Posted byAlabamaDUIDefense.comat8:53 AM
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Wednesday, August 1, 2012
Antojos de alcohol inducidas a través de serotonina aumento
por Ann Blake Tracy, Director, ICFDA
Hay una conexión alarmante entre los diversos medicamentos que aumentan la serotonina y el alcoholismo. El más popular de estas drogas es: PROZAC, ZOLOFT, PAXIL, LUVOX, SERZONE, EFFEXOR, DIGOXIN y la nueva dieta píldoras, FEN-PHEN y REDUX. Durante siete años numerosos informes realizados por alcohólicos reformadas (algunos durante 15 años y más) que están siendo "conducidos" al alcohol después de uno de estos medicamentos se prescriben. Y muchos otros pacientes sin antecedentes de alcoholismo han continuado que informe una "compulsión abrumadora" beber mientras usa estos medicamentos.
(Algunas cuentas personales: mujer joven # 1, un alcohólico en recuperación, informó que durante el período de ocho meses ella había estado usando Prozac encontró necesario para asistir a reuniones de AA cada día con el fin de luchar contra las fuertes compulsiones para comenzar a beber nuevamente. # 2 en el sudeste de Estados Unidos una media de psicólogo, también un alcohólico en recuperación, después de ser recetado Prozac, se encontró que necesitan asistir a AA reuniones mañana, mediodía y noche para evitar destruir la sobriedad que ella había logrado. # 3 A joven padre, quien era Mormón y había nunca antes en su alcohol de vida usada, encontró bebiendo alguna vez clara y exhibiendo comportamiento extraño como violento, después de ser recetado Prozac y Ritalin. # 4 Madre joven que nunca ha usado alcohol antes empezó a beber grandes cantidades dentro de semanas de ser recetado Prozac y rápidamente se encontró comprometido a una institución mental debido al comportamiento psicótico que resultó. Agregó a su receta de Prozac fueron medicamentos antipsicóticos y tratamientos de choque eléctrico. Luego comenzó a experimentar convulsiones y se inició en medicamentos anticonvulsivos. # 5 Trate vecino informó que su amiga estaba bebiendo Vodka recta sobre una base regular después de ser recetado Zoloft. Hija de A # 6 informó que su padre, sobrio durante 15 años, comenzó a beber nuevamente de Prozac. El informe de la constante de estos pacientes ha sido una "abrumadora antojo o coacción" de alcohol.)
Durante algún tiempo no teníamos documentación médica específica para ayudarnos a entender por qué esto estaba pasando. ¿Podría ser que Prozac, Zoloft, Paxil, etc., siendo humor alterar sustancias, fueron quitando las inhibiciones que individuos habían colocado a sí mismos para detener sus complementos? Pero más allá de este efecto de alteración de estado de ánimo de Prozac, etc., parece ser una causa fisiológica para esta obsesión alcohólica también. Hubo informes de personas que rara vez bebían antes de Prozac, etc., consumen cantidades excesivas de alcohol después de iniciar el uso de estas drogas diferentes. Por ejemplo tenemos el caso de un joven recién se casaron en el sur de Utah que recibió Prozac por un desequilibrio hormonal. Antes de ese momento tendría dos o tres bebidas sociales un año, sin embargo poco después de ser recetado Prozac comenzó a casa trayendo alcohol por el caso. Seguido de muchos informes similares.
Podría ser que debido a que estas drogas tienen un efecto adverso fuerte sobre el páncreas
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Tuesday, July 31, 2012
Are FST's an Accurate Method to Base Arrest Decision?
Separating Myth from Fact: A Review of Research on the Field Sobriety Tests
Spurgeon Cole
&
Ronald H. Nowaczyk
Clemson University
Clemson, SC 29634
For over a decade Marcelline Burns, senior author of an often-cited 1977 NHTSA (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration) report and co-author of a 1981 NHTSA study, has traveled across the country extolling the virtues of the new and improved Field Sobriety test (FST) battery. The FST battery, as recommended by NHTSA, consists of three tests that are supposed to predict an individual’s blood alcohol (BAG) level. The tests are the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, the Walk-and-turn test and the One-leg stand test. None of these tests were specifically developed to identify BAG level, but have been used by law enforcement as indicators of driving impairment.
NHTSA claims that the new version of the FST battery is scientific and can differentiate between impaired and unimpaired drivers. Until recently Burns’ testimony has gone unchallenged because few attorneys have the prerequisite understanding of statistics and test development to critically evaluate the NHTSA reports and effectively cross-examine NHTSA’s witnesses. Judges who have recently heard the “rFST of the story” are either not admitting the FST entirely or declaring it unscientific and not allowing police to use such terms as “tests” “results” “passed” or “failure.”2
The prosecution in DUI trials has long held a decided advantage over the defense because of misconceptions about the effectiveness of the FST. Even defense attorneys have often accepted the premise that the FST has a measure of value in predicting driving impairment. In essence, NHTSA representatives have for over a decade enjoyed a free ride, but the road has recently developed some serious pot holes.
Research (Cole & Cole, 1991; Cole & Nowaczyk, 1994) and expert testimony offered by Cole & Nowaczyk have enabled judges and attorneys to better understand the limitations of the FST. In the past, NHTSA representatives have made outlandish claims as to the effectiveness of the FST even though these claims are not supported by their own research data. Because of these sins of omission and an occasional sin of commission, many myths have developed concerning the validity and reliability of the FST battery. The present article attempts to separate the facts from the myths.
Myth 1: The Field Sobriety TFST (FST) battery predicts driving impairment.
Fact: NHTSA never attempted to determine if the FST could predict driving Impairment. There is not a single study linking the recommended FST battery directly to driving impairment. The fact is, there never wilt be a simple roadside coordination task that can predict driving impairment. In one of NHTSA’s own reports, the following statement is made “… even valid, behavioral tests are likely to be poor predictors either of actual behind-the-wheel driving …or of accidents” (p. 2-7, Snapper, Seaver & Schwartz, 1981.) The stated goal in the 1977 study was to determine the relationship between FST and intoxication and driving impairment. However, they did not investigate the relationship between the FST and driving impairment.
While there is a relationship between BAC level and driving impairment, the relationship is not likely to be a simple linear one. Therefore, it is not appropriate to assume that 1) if FST performance and BAC are related and 2) if BAC and driving Impairment are related, therefore, 3) FST and driving impairment are related. The relationships among these factors are too complex to assume a simple relationship as NHTSA might like you to conclude. There are comments among NHTSA researchers themselves alluding to this conclusion. In the 1981 NHTSA study, the researchers conclude,”…Individuals vary in alcohol tolerance, and infrequent drinker may be severely impaired at a BAC of 0.05, whereas a heavy drinker may show only minimal Impairment at this level” (p. 19). Dr. Moskowitz, one of the co-authors of both the 1977 and 1981 NHTSA studies, co-authored a later review of research on driving and alcohol, levels and concluded in a presentation at a scientific conference that,”... studies of driving simulator and on-the-road testing varied widely in results. This is due to the wide range of behavioral demands required by diverse control and visual search requirements” (Moskowitz & Robinson, 1987, p. 85). It is obvious that research is needed examining the relationship between FST and driving performance directly. That research has not yet been conducted. Dr. Burns herself indicated that the FST battery has its value in predicting BAG levels (Burns, 1984).
Myth 2: The FST battery is 80 percent accurate in differentiating between Individuals with BAC levels above or below .10.
Fact: The 1981 NHTSA study is the one cited by NHTSA as evidence of an 80 percent accuracy rate with the use of the FST battery. That study tested 296 subjects. Thirty-three percent of the subjects in the study had a BAC level of .00 and 34 percent were given dose levels calculated to raise BAG levels to .05. Another 11 percent of the subjects had BAG levels approximating .15, with some having BACs as high as .18. An officer should have no difficulty correctly identifying totally alcohol-free subjects as being unimpaired. Although slightly more difficult, one would expect officers to correctly classify subjects with BAC levels of .05 as being unimpaired. They should also have little difficulty correctly classifying subjects with the BAG levels of .15. In effect, 78 percent of the subjects fall into these extreme categories. Only 22 percent of the subjects were in the critical BAC range around .10. When the tests must differentiate in this critical range, they fail miserably. The overall accuracy rate of .80 is. misleading when over two-thirds of the decisions are “gimmies,” people with little or no alcohol or levels of .15.
For the remaining subjects, the officers have a 50/50 chance of being correct just on the basis of guessing. With the “easy” decisions and a guessing rate of .50, the reported 80 percent accuracy rate does not look exceptionally good. The question should not be how does the FST help officers correctly classify subjects 80 percent of the time. Instead, the question asked should be “Why doesn’t the FST do a better job helping the officers reach the correct decision?” In fact, the 1977 NHTSA report contains the following admonition, “Again, it should be pointed out that all the evidence from these data suggest it is unrealistic to attempt to use behavioral tests to discriminate BACS in a .02 margin around a given level” (P.41).
Myth 3: The FSTs are tests accepted by the scientific community.
Fact: Anastasi (1988) defines a test as being an objective and standardized measure of behavior, in the behavioral sciences, specific criteria must be met for a behavioral test to be accepted. The primary criteria include establishing the reliability, validity, and standardized administration of the test. Reliability and validity involve the consistency of test scores and the relationship of the score to the behavior it is designed to measure. Standardization includes uniformity of procedure in administering the test as well as the scoring of the test. For test scores to be meaningful the test conditions under which the tests are administered must not be causing differences in test scores. A test that has not been standardized or does not outline exact procedures for administration and scoring would not be considered a scientific test.
An important step in the standardization of a test is the development of norms and as the name suggests, a norm is the normal, average or typical score. Scores can only be interpreted by comparing them with scores obtained by others. There are no adequate norms for the FST battery. Common sense dictates and research supports the belief that motor skills decline with age. The FST, however, provides no basis for interpreting the results for individuals at various age levels. Although, manuals for DWl training suggest that tests should not be given to individuals who are 60 years of age or older or to a person more than 50 pounds overweight, it provides no information on how to evaluate the performance of a 45 year old versus a 20 year old (NHTSA, 1992).
Examiners cannot adequately interpret a score, unless they know the mean and the standard deviation of the distribution. NHTSA leads us to believe that the “norm” for a sober person would be a test score of 0; that is, no errors in performance. Yet, we know from the 1977 NHTSA study that all of the sober people in that study made at least one error. In fact, the mean number of error “cues” scored among the sober individuals was 10.56.3
Even if NHTSA’s claim that the FST is not a norm-referenced test, but rather a criterion-referenced test (that is, that a certain score (criterion point) indicates failure), there are no data indicating how this criterion score might vary as a function of age, gender, or motor coordination. Even, if such norms were produced from the NHTSA 1977 and 1981 studies, they would be of limited value given that they are based on laboratory testing, not testing in the field.
Myth 4: The field sobriety tests are reliable.
Fact: Reliability refers to the consistency n test scores. Reliability scores can range from a low of .00, which indicates no consistency, to 1 .00, which indicates perfect consistency. A test with a reliability value of .90 would indicate that 90 percent of the variability in the test scores is attributed to true differences in performance and 10 percent would be due to error. Most well-established tests (e.g., Wechsler scales for lQ, SAT, GRE) have reliability values greater than .90. The scientific community expects reliability coefficients to be in the upper .80s or .90s for a test to be scientifically reliable (Anastasi, 1958; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1990).
The HGN, One-leg stand, and Walk-and-turn tests have test-retest reliabilities of .66, .72, and .61 respectively with a combined reliability of 77. This means that 34 percent of the HGN, 28 percent of the One-leg stand and 39 percent of the Walk-and-turn test scores can be attributed to errors in scoring. If 23 percent of the score on a breathalyzer depended on the manufacturer of the device, would it be allowed into evidence? Quite possibly the most telling lack of reliability of the FST battery is that when different officers tested the same subjects at the same dose level on different days, the reliability was only .59. This means that 41 percent of the score was due to error. These reliabilities are far too low to be useful in making important decisions. By contrast the reliability of the BAC machine readings was .96, indicating a high level of reliability.
Myth 5: The field sobriety tests are scientifically valid.
Fact: The 1977 NHTSA study reported the results in terms of validity coefficients. The validity coefficient for HGN, One-leg stand and Walk-and-turn tests was .67, .48, and .55 respectively with a combined validity coefficient of 67. For example, if the officer used the individual FSTs, the accuracy in predicting the BAC levels would increase by only 26 percent with the HGN test, 12 percent with the one-leg stand test and 16 percent with the walk-and-turn test. If all three tests were administered, accuracy in predicting BAC levels would improve by only 26 percent. The error in predicting BAG levels using the HGN, the one leg stand, and the walk-and-turn combined would be 74 percent as large as it would be by chance.
For the FST battery to be a valid predictor of BAC, it must not only identify individuals above a BAC level of .10 as “failing, “ but also identify individuals below .10 as “passing.” That is, the test must have discriminative power. In NHTSA’s own studies, a significant proportion of people who were below the .10 BAG standard in effect at that time were falsely viewed as being impaired. In the 1977 Burns and Moskowitz study, 46.5 percent of the “arrest” decisions by participating officers were incorrect. Of the 101 arrest decisions, 47 subjects had BAG levels less than .10. The authors, themselves conclude, “Obviously, an error rate of 46.5 percent in making arrests is not acceptable” (p.25).
In the follow-up study by Tharp et. Al. (1981), the false arrest rate was 32 percent. The primary reason for the decrease in false alarm from 46.5 percent in the ‘77 NHTSA study to 32 percent in the 1981 study was not due solely to the “new improved FST,” but partly to the distribution of subjects across the dose levels. In the ‘77 NHTSA study 27 percent of subjects were in the critical range (BAC in the middle range) and in the ‘81 NHTSA study only 22 percent of subjects were in the middle range. In other words the distribution in the ‘81 NHTSA study made discriminations easier. If the ‘81 NHTSA study had used the same distribution of BAC levels that were employed in the ‘77 NHTSA study, the false arrest rate would have been higher than 32 percent and probably would have matched the “unacceptable” 46.5 level of the ’77 NHTSA study. These validity scores are quite low and suggest that the FST battery is of little benefit for an officer determining BAC levels.
Myth 6: NHTSA has validated the FST in a field setting.
Fact: The 1977 and 1981 NHTSA studies were conducted in a laboratory setting. It is obvious that laboratory studies are very different from studies performed in a natural or field setting. Laboratories are quite different from real life situations. For example, the influence of alcohol on the individual depends greatly on the social context, as well as the expectations of the person. Subjects in these NHTSA studies were told not to eat eight hours prior to the testing. Test subjects were tested at 15-minute intervals, and the study began early in the morning. This would mean that many subjects had not eaten for long as 12 hours before being tested. It is doubtful that a person drinking in a natural setting would fast for hours and then consume alcohol at unknown ethanol levels.
Laboratories are artificial by nature and only gives an indication of what one might expect in a field setting. In the conclusions of the 1981 NHTSA study, the authors recommended that the field sobriety test should be validated in the field for 18 months and in various localities across the nation. The 1983 NHTSA study by Anderson, et al., the purported “field validation” of the FST battery, did not meet those recommendations, A 3-month study was conducted in a limited number of locations on the east coast. Dr. Bums has testified on cross examination4 that the FST has never been adequately field tested. Most importantly the FST has never been standardized or validated in a field getting.
Myth 7: The NHTSA studies have been published in Peer Reviewed Journals.
Fact: Neither of the 1977 or 1981 NHTSA studies has been published in a scientific peer-reviewed journal. The publications have been limited to technical reports issued by NHTSA. Dr. Burns has admitted on cross examination3 that the method and results sections were too lengthy to be published in a scientific journal. Based on this logic lengthy but important studies would never be published. It is difficult to see how the NHTSA could claim that the FST Is accepted in the scientific community, when results of studies on the validation of the FST have never appeared in a scientific peer reviewed journal, which is’ a basic requirement for acceptance by the scientific community.
Myth 8: There is a consistent relationship between BAC levels and driving impairment.
Fact: The literature on the effects of alcohol is so diverse that one can only conclude that any demanding task may be impaired at almost any BAC level. Research indicates that there are substantial individual variations in the metabolism of alcohol which would, most likely affect performance. Performance is also affected by individual differences and individuals with identical BAC levels, may very well have different levels of impairment (Hurst and Bagley, 1972; Moskowitz, Daily and Henderson, 1974). Many studies involving the influence of alcohol on impairment find a rather significant number of subjects whose performance actually increases after the consumption of alcohol. In a study conducted under the auspices of the California Highway Patrol and various law enforcement agencies, Giguire (1985) found that 17 percent of his subjects with doses calculated to achieve BAG levels of .10 improved driving performance on a closed course. Mangarin & Standery (1989) also found no effects of alcohol dose on a video driving performance despite an unusually high dose calculated to achieve a BAG of .16. These studies and others suggest a complex relationship between BAC levels and performance and offers little support for setting specific BAC impairment levels and certainly does not support the assumption that BAG levels could be used as a substitute criteria for driving impairment.
Myth 9: People who are not impaired can “pass” the Field Sobriety Tests.
Fact: Cole and Nowaczyk (1991) had 21 adults perform field sobriety tests who were completely alcohol free, as confirmed by breath tests. The subjects were given six tests including a heel to toe test and a one leg stand test. None of the subjects was under the extreme pressure that is associated with a roadside detention situation. Two separate groups of law enforcement officers gathered at different times to judge the performance of the participants. These were actual police officers who had received standard training in the observation and Identification of intoxicated drivers. The officers were then asked to identify individuals who had too much to drink to drive. Of 147 responses by the police officers, 68 of those responses (46 percent) indicated that a completely sober person was too intoxicated to drive, The average police experience was 12 years. Interestingly, the officer with the least experience had the fewest wrong responses.
Compton (1985) found false positive rates for totally alcohol free participants to be as high as 54 percent for some police departments. In the 1981 NHTSA study 18 percent of alcohol-free subjects and 31 percent of subjects with BAC levels of .05 were judged to be impaired. Clearly, there is a strong tendency for certified alcohol-free participants to fail Field Sobriety Tests.
Myth 10: The Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) Test is the most sensitive test for measuring Impairment.
Fact: Because the HGN test is a physiological task unlike the other Field Sobriety Tests which are psychomotor, divided-attention tasks, it is sometimes viewed as being the most sensitive of the three tests. Also, some of NHTSA’S research indicates it has the strongest relationship with BAC (e.g., Burns & Moskowitz, 1977 (p. 17
View the Original article
Spurgeon Cole
&
Ronald H. Nowaczyk
Clemson University
Clemson, SC 29634
For over a decade Marcelline Burns, senior author of an often-cited 1977 NHTSA (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration) report and co-author of a 1981 NHTSA study, has traveled across the country extolling the virtues of the new and improved Field Sobriety test (FST) battery. The FST battery, as recommended by NHTSA, consists of three tests that are supposed to predict an individual’s blood alcohol (BAG) level. The tests are the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, the Walk-and-turn test and the One-leg stand test. None of these tests were specifically developed to identify BAG level, but have been used by law enforcement as indicators of driving impairment.
NHTSA claims that the new version of the FST battery is scientific and can differentiate between impaired and unimpaired drivers. Until recently Burns’ testimony has gone unchallenged because few attorneys have the prerequisite understanding of statistics and test development to critically evaluate the NHTSA reports and effectively cross-examine NHTSA’s witnesses. Judges who have recently heard the “rFST of the story” are either not admitting the FST entirely or declaring it unscientific and not allowing police to use such terms as “tests” “results” “passed” or “failure.”2
The prosecution in DUI trials has long held a decided advantage over the defense because of misconceptions about the effectiveness of the FST. Even defense attorneys have often accepted the premise that the FST has a measure of value in predicting driving impairment. In essence, NHTSA representatives have for over a decade enjoyed a free ride, but the road has recently developed some serious pot holes.
Research (Cole & Cole, 1991; Cole & Nowaczyk, 1994) and expert testimony offered by Cole & Nowaczyk have enabled judges and attorneys to better understand the limitations of the FST. In the past, NHTSA representatives have made outlandish claims as to the effectiveness of the FST even though these claims are not supported by their own research data. Because of these sins of omission and an occasional sin of commission, many myths have developed concerning the validity and reliability of the FST battery. The present article attempts to separate the facts from the myths.
Myth 1: The Field Sobriety TFST (FST) battery predicts driving impairment.
Fact: NHTSA never attempted to determine if the FST could predict driving Impairment. There is not a single study linking the recommended FST battery directly to driving impairment. The fact is, there never wilt be a simple roadside coordination task that can predict driving impairment. In one of NHTSA’s own reports, the following statement is made “… even valid, behavioral tests are likely to be poor predictors either of actual behind-the-wheel driving …or of accidents” (p. 2-7, Snapper, Seaver & Schwartz, 1981.) The stated goal in the 1977 study was to determine the relationship between FST and intoxication and driving impairment. However, they did not investigate the relationship between the FST and driving impairment.
While there is a relationship between BAC level and driving impairment, the relationship is not likely to be a simple linear one. Therefore, it is not appropriate to assume that 1) if FST performance and BAC are related and 2) if BAC and driving Impairment are related, therefore, 3) FST and driving impairment are related. The relationships among these factors are too complex to assume a simple relationship as NHTSA might like you to conclude. There are comments among NHTSA researchers themselves alluding to this conclusion. In the 1981 NHTSA study, the researchers conclude,”…Individuals vary in alcohol tolerance, and infrequent drinker may be severely impaired at a BAC of 0.05, whereas a heavy drinker may show only minimal Impairment at this level” (p. 19). Dr. Moskowitz, one of the co-authors of both the 1977 and 1981 NHTSA studies, co-authored a later review of research on driving and alcohol, levels and concluded in a presentation at a scientific conference that,”... studies of driving simulator and on-the-road testing varied widely in results. This is due to the wide range of behavioral demands required by diverse control and visual search requirements” (Moskowitz & Robinson, 1987, p. 85). It is obvious that research is needed examining the relationship between FST and driving performance directly. That research has not yet been conducted. Dr. Burns herself indicated that the FST battery has its value in predicting BAG levels (Burns, 1984).
Myth 2: The FST battery is 80 percent accurate in differentiating between Individuals with BAC levels above or below .10.
Fact: The 1981 NHTSA study is the one cited by NHTSA as evidence of an 80 percent accuracy rate with the use of the FST battery. That study tested 296 subjects. Thirty-three percent of the subjects in the study had a BAC level of .00 and 34 percent were given dose levels calculated to raise BAG levels to .05. Another 11 percent of the subjects had BAG levels approximating .15, with some having BACs as high as .18. An officer should have no difficulty correctly identifying totally alcohol-free subjects as being unimpaired. Although slightly more difficult, one would expect officers to correctly classify subjects with BAC levels of .05 as being unimpaired. They should also have little difficulty correctly classifying subjects with the BAG levels of .15. In effect, 78 percent of the subjects fall into these extreme categories. Only 22 percent of the subjects were in the critical BAC range around .10. When the tests must differentiate in this critical range, they fail miserably. The overall accuracy rate of .80 is. misleading when over two-thirds of the decisions are “gimmies,” people with little or no alcohol or levels of .15.
For the remaining subjects, the officers have a 50/50 chance of being correct just on the basis of guessing. With the “easy” decisions and a guessing rate of .50, the reported 80 percent accuracy rate does not look exceptionally good. The question should not be how does the FST help officers correctly classify subjects 80 percent of the time. Instead, the question asked should be “Why doesn’t the FST do a better job helping the officers reach the correct decision?” In fact, the 1977 NHTSA report contains the following admonition, “Again, it should be pointed out that all the evidence from these data suggest it is unrealistic to attempt to use behavioral tests to discriminate BACS in a .02 margin around a given level” (P.41).
Myth 3: The FSTs are tests accepted by the scientific community.
Fact: Anastasi (1988) defines a test as being an objective and standardized measure of behavior, in the behavioral sciences, specific criteria must be met for a behavioral test to be accepted. The primary criteria include establishing the reliability, validity, and standardized administration of the test. Reliability and validity involve the consistency of test scores and the relationship of the score to the behavior it is designed to measure. Standardization includes uniformity of procedure in administering the test as well as the scoring of the test. For test scores to be meaningful the test conditions under which the tests are administered must not be causing differences in test scores. A test that has not been standardized or does not outline exact procedures for administration and scoring would not be considered a scientific test.
An important step in the standardization of a test is the development of norms and as the name suggests, a norm is the normal, average or typical score. Scores can only be interpreted by comparing them with scores obtained by others. There are no adequate norms for the FST battery. Common sense dictates and research supports the belief that motor skills decline with age. The FST, however, provides no basis for interpreting the results for individuals at various age levels. Although, manuals for DWl training suggest that tests should not be given to individuals who are 60 years of age or older or to a person more than 50 pounds overweight, it provides no information on how to evaluate the performance of a 45 year old versus a 20 year old (NHTSA, 1992).
Examiners cannot adequately interpret a score, unless they know the mean and the standard deviation of the distribution. NHTSA leads us to believe that the “norm” for a sober person would be a test score of 0; that is, no errors in performance. Yet, we know from the 1977 NHTSA study that all of the sober people in that study made at least one error. In fact, the mean number of error “cues” scored among the sober individuals was 10.56.3
Even if NHTSA’s claim that the FST is not a norm-referenced test, but rather a criterion-referenced test (that is, that a certain score (criterion point) indicates failure), there are no data indicating how this criterion score might vary as a function of age, gender, or motor coordination. Even, if such norms were produced from the NHTSA 1977 and 1981 studies, they would be of limited value given that they are based on laboratory testing, not testing in the field.
Myth 4: The field sobriety tests are reliable.
Fact: Reliability refers to the consistency n test scores. Reliability scores can range from a low of .00, which indicates no consistency, to 1 .00, which indicates perfect consistency. A test with a reliability value of .90 would indicate that 90 percent of the variability in the test scores is attributed to true differences in performance and 10 percent would be due to error. Most well-established tests (e.g., Wechsler scales for lQ, SAT, GRE) have reliability values greater than .90. The scientific community expects reliability coefficients to be in the upper .80s or .90s for a test to be scientifically reliable (Anastasi, 1958; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1990).
The HGN, One-leg stand, and Walk-and-turn tests have test-retest reliabilities of .66, .72, and .61 respectively with a combined reliability of 77. This means that 34 percent of the HGN, 28 percent of the One-leg stand and 39 percent of the Walk-and-turn test scores can be attributed to errors in scoring. If 23 percent of the score on a breathalyzer depended on the manufacturer of the device, would it be allowed into evidence? Quite possibly the most telling lack of reliability of the FST battery is that when different officers tested the same subjects at the same dose level on different days, the reliability was only .59. This means that 41 percent of the score was due to error. These reliabilities are far too low to be useful in making important decisions. By contrast the reliability of the BAC machine readings was .96, indicating a high level of reliability.
Myth 5: The field sobriety tests are scientifically valid.
Fact: The 1977 NHTSA study reported the results in terms of validity coefficients. The validity coefficient for HGN, One-leg stand and Walk-and-turn tests was .67, .48, and .55 respectively with a combined validity coefficient of 67. For example, if the officer used the individual FSTs, the accuracy in predicting the BAC levels would increase by only 26 percent with the HGN test, 12 percent with the one-leg stand test and 16 percent with the walk-and-turn test. If all three tests were administered, accuracy in predicting BAC levels would improve by only 26 percent. The error in predicting BAG levels using the HGN, the one leg stand, and the walk-and-turn combined would be 74 percent as large as it would be by chance.
For the FST battery to be a valid predictor of BAC, it must not only identify individuals above a BAC level of .10 as “failing, “ but also identify individuals below .10 as “passing.” That is, the test must have discriminative power. In NHTSA’s own studies, a significant proportion of people who were below the .10 BAG standard in effect at that time were falsely viewed as being impaired. In the 1977 Burns and Moskowitz study, 46.5 percent of the “arrest” decisions by participating officers were incorrect. Of the 101 arrest decisions, 47 subjects had BAG levels less than .10. The authors, themselves conclude, “Obviously, an error rate of 46.5 percent in making arrests is not acceptable” (p.25).
In the follow-up study by Tharp et. Al. (1981), the false arrest rate was 32 percent. The primary reason for the decrease in false alarm from 46.5 percent in the ‘77 NHTSA study to 32 percent in the 1981 study was not due solely to the “new improved FST,” but partly to the distribution of subjects across the dose levels. In the ‘77 NHTSA study 27 percent of subjects were in the critical range (BAC in the middle range) and in the ‘81 NHTSA study only 22 percent of subjects were in the middle range. In other words the distribution in the ‘81 NHTSA study made discriminations easier. If the ‘81 NHTSA study had used the same distribution of BAC levels that were employed in the ‘77 NHTSA study, the false arrest rate would have been higher than 32 percent and probably would have matched the “unacceptable” 46.5 level of the ’77 NHTSA study. These validity scores are quite low and suggest that the FST battery is of little benefit for an officer determining BAC levels.
Myth 6: NHTSA has validated the FST in a field setting.
Fact: The 1977 and 1981 NHTSA studies were conducted in a laboratory setting. It is obvious that laboratory studies are very different from studies performed in a natural or field setting. Laboratories are quite different from real life situations. For example, the influence of alcohol on the individual depends greatly on the social context, as well as the expectations of the person. Subjects in these NHTSA studies were told not to eat eight hours prior to the testing. Test subjects were tested at 15-minute intervals, and the study began early in the morning. This would mean that many subjects had not eaten for long as 12 hours before being tested. It is doubtful that a person drinking in a natural setting would fast for hours and then consume alcohol at unknown ethanol levels.
Laboratories are artificial by nature and only gives an indication of what one might expect in a field setting. In the conclusions of the 1981 NHTSA study, the authors recommended that the field sobriety test should be validated in the field for 18 months and in various localities across the nation. The 1983 NHTSA study by Anderson, et al., the purported “field validation” of the FST battery, did not meet those recommendations, A 3-month study was conducted in a limited number of locations on the east coast. Dr. Bums has testified on cross examination4 that the FST has never been adequately field tested. Most importantly the FST has never been standardized or validated in a field getting.
Myth 7: The NHTSA studies have been published in Peer Reviewed Journals.
Fact: Neither of the 1977 or 1981 NHTSA studies has been published in a scientific peer-reviewed journal. The publications have been limited to technical reports issued by NHTSA. Dr. Burns has admitted on cross examination3 that the method and results sections were too lengthy to be published in a scientific journal. Based on this logic lengthy but important studies would never be published. It is difficult to see how the NHTSA could claim that the FST Is accepted in the scientific community, when results of studies on the validation of the FST have never appeared in a scientific peer reviewed journal, which is’ a basic requirement for acceptance by the scientific community.
Myth 8: There is a consistent relationship between BAC levels and driving impairment.
Fact: The literature on the effects of alcohol is so diverse that one can only conclude that any demanding task may be impaired at almost any BAC level. Research indicates that there are substantial individual variations in the metabolism of alcohol which would, most likely affect performance. Performance is also affected by individual differences and individuals with identical BAC levels, may very well have different levels of impairment (Hurst and Bagley, 1972; Moskowitz, Daily and Henderson, 1974). Many studies involving the influence of alcohol on impairment find a rather significant number of subjects whose performance actually increases after the consumption of alcohol. In a study conducted under the auspices of the California Highway Patrol and various law enforcement agencies, Giguire (1985) found that 17 percent of his subjects with doses calculated to achieve BAG levels of .10 improved driving performance on a closed course. Mangarin & Standery (1989) also found no effects of alcohol dose on a video driving performance despite an unusually high dose calculated to achieve a BAG of .16. These studies and others suggest a complex relationship between BAC levels and performance and offers little support for setting specific BAC impairment levels and certainly does not support the assumption that BAG levels could be used as a substitute criteria for driving impairment.
Myth 9: People who are not impaired can “pass” the Field Sobriety Tests.
Fact: Cole and Nowaczyk (1991) had 21 adults perform field sobriety tests who were completely alcohol free, as confirmed by breath tests. The subjects were given six tests including a heel to toe test and a one leg stand test. None of the subjects was under the extreme pressure that is associated with a roadside detention situation. Two separate groups of law enforcement officers gathered at different times to judge the performance of the participants. These were actual police officers who had received standard training in the observation and Identification of intoxicated drivers. The officers were then asked to identify individuals who had too much to drink to drive. Of 147 responses by the police officers, 68 of those responses (46 percent) indicated that a completely sober person was too intoxicated to drive, The average police experience was 12 years. Interestingly, the officer with the least experience had the fewest wrong responses.
Compton (1985) found false positive rates for totally alcohol free participants to be as high as 54 percent for some police departments. In the 1981 NHTSA study 18 percent of alcohol-free subjects and 31 percent of subjects with BAC levels of .05 were judged to be impaired. Clearly, there is a strong tendency for certified alcohol-free participants to fail Field Sobriety Tests.
Myth 10: The Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) Test is the most sensitive test for measuring Impairment.
Fact: Because the HGN test is a physiological task unlike the other Field Sobriety Tests which are psychomotor, divided-attention tasks, it is sometimes viewed as being the most sensitive of the three tests. Also, some of NHTSA’S research indicates it has the strongest relationship with BAC (e.g., Burns & Moskowitz, 1977 (p. 17
View the Original article
Monday, July 30, 2012
DUI Rogue Cop injustamente encarcelados decenas
TAMPA - Daniel Brock ganó grandes elogios para encarcelar a los automovilistas con problemas. Mothers Against Drunk Driving le honró. También lo hicieron a sus jefes. Pero uno de los diputados de DUI más agresivos del Condado de Hillsborough haya erróneamente enviado docenas de personas a la cárcel, la Oficina del Sheriff reconoció en jueves, 14 de junio de 2007.
La Agencia dispararon Brock el 24 de mayo. En un año, Brock detenido 58 personas cuyo contenido de alcohol en sangre estaba por debajo de 0,08, el nivel en que la ley estatal presume que un conductor se vea afectado, mostró una auditoría de asuntos internos. "No prescribir a la teoría de que de alguna manera tienes que ser 0,08 a ser bebido o deterioro", Brock, 38, dijeron los investigadores. (Nota del editor: apuesto a que "prescribe" a la teoría de que de alguna manera todo el mundo se deteriora o demasiado borracho para conducir a.08)
Un controlador puede cargarse con DUI en Florida, si el nivel de alcohol en sangre es entre 0.05 y 0.08 por ciento, pero debe haber otra evidencia de deterioro, como por ejemplo un vehículo apreciar. En 43 de los 58 casos, los automovilistas no demostraron ningún deterioro visible detrás del volante, según un informe de asuntos internos hizo público jueves. En 41 arrestos, Brock tampoco hacer una caja con muestras de orina, señala el informe.
Repetidamente, los investigadores encontraron que Brock reportó fallas en las pruebas de sobriedad de campo cuando su cámara de video de patrulla documentado todo lo contrario. Por ejemplo, escribió que un conductor de 25 de octubre de 2005, había perdido el equilibrio mientras girando. El video del encuentro mostró que no era el caso. El controlador sopló un 0.01 en la prueba de aliento, pero fue detenido de todos modos. Dijo que los controladores incorrectamente recitan el alfabeto, utilizaban armas para equilibrio e incoherentemente discurso - cuando el video mostró correctos alfabetos, equilibrio perfecto y claro discurso.
Los registros muestran que sacó gente en paradas de DUI 17 veces mientras su crucero fue ocupada con otros presos. Es contra el procedimiento. Rutinariamente presentó informes de arresto días, incluso semanas, después de realizar un arresto. Le dijo a asuntos internos Detective Bruce Crumpler que siempre informó los resultados de pruebas de sobriedad de campo basados en memoria. ¿No dejar margen para errores, Crumpler preguntó? "Bueno, no hay margen para el error,"Brock dijo Crumpler."Nunca he tenido un problema." (Nota del editor: hasta ahora su trabajo no fue en la línea, no fue restringida su libertad y su licencia no estaba en peligro. No es extraño que nunca había tenido un problema.)
Su papeleo se convirtió en objeto de desprecio en la Oficina del fiscal del estado de Hillsborough, donde los fiscales dijeron que el diputado ha empañado su reputación mediante la presentación de informes de arresto inexacta que carecían de detalles importantes. "No tiene una muy buena reputación por ser un muy buen oficial de DUI que nos preocupamos de trabajar con," fiscal Jennifer Gabbard dijo a Crumpler."Es casi como lo que usted puede hacer para que luzca como está arrestando a gente."
Desde octubre de 2005 a octubre de 2006, Brock realizaron 313 detenciones por conducir bajo la influencia. Él no pudo activar el equipo de audio y vídeo de su crucero en 40 por ciento de sus paradas, en lugar de ello confía en su "memoria de forjado" importante recordar arresta detalles, mostró la auditoría. Dentro de la Oficina del Sheriff, Brock adjunto previamente había sido elogiado por su "destacado servicio profesional" y recomendó consistentemente aumentos. Sus superiores clasificaron su desempeño "satisfactorio" y lo llamaban un crédito a la Oficina. Él fue elogiado como un adjunto dedicado quien habló a los estudiantes de secundaria acerca de los peligros de conducir.
"Sentíamos siempre fue un buen oficial," dijo Becky Gage, 55, el abogado de la víctima para el capítulo de MADD de Hillsborough.Como oficiales están dentro del alcance de la ley, entonces apoyamos sus esfuerzos para quitar controladores de deteriorados". (Nota del editor: liderazgo de MADD abraza un estándar de "tolerancia cero" para todos, por lo que ellos creen que una persona que bebía una cerveza en un juego de pelota debe ser detenido.)
Sin embargo, el ex diputado encontró unos baches de la carretera. Fue suspendido y enviado a la escuela de manejo en 2000 después de una cadena de lo que la Oficina del Sheriff considera que los accidentes de tránsito evitables. En 2006, fue nombrado en un pleito federal alegando que atacó físicamente a la madre de un adolescente arrestado en 2002. La mujer del Condado de Hillsborough, dijo Brock obligó a sí mismo en su casa, empujó a una esquina y le rociado con aerosol de pimienta. La demanda no se ha resuelta.
Durante la reciente investigación de asuntos internos, Brock negó tratando de aumentar la cantidad de reconocimiento personal. Era jueves claro si Brock pretende apelar su despido. Le dijo a los investigadores que les da la oportunidad, él realizaría sus paradas DUI del mismo modo. Brock dijo: "quiero decir, un mundo perfecto, necesitamos más diputados y menos personas."Posted byAlabamaDUIDefense.comat7:42 AM
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La Agencia dispararon Brock el 24 de mayo. En un año, Brock detenido 58 personas cuyo contenido de alcohol en sangre estaba por debajo de 0,08, el nivel en que la ley estatal presume que un conductor se vea afectado, mostró una auditoría de asuntos internos. "No prescribir a la teoría de que de alguna manera tienes que ser 0,08 a ser bebido o deterioro", Brock, 38, dijeron los investigadores. (Nota del editor: apuesto a que "prescribe" a la teoría de que de alguna manera todo el mundo se deteriora o demasiado borracho para conducir a.08)
Un controlador puede cargarse con DUI en Florida, si el nivel de alcohol en sangre es entre 0.05 y 0.08 por ciento, pero debe haber otra evidencia de deterioro, como por ejemplo un vehículo apreciar. En 43 de los 58 casos, los automovilistas no demostraron ningún deterioro visible detrás del volante, según un informe de asuntos internos hizo público jueves. En 41 arrestos, Brock tampoco hacer una caja con muestras de orina, señala el informe.
Repetidamente, los investigadores encontraron que Brock reportó fallas en las pruebas de sobriedad de campo cuando su cámara de video de patrulla documentado todo lo contrario. Por ejemplo, escribió que un conductor de 25 de octubre de 2005, había perdido el equilibrio mientras girando. El video del encuentro mostró que no era el caso. El controlador sopló un 0.01 en la prueba de aliento, pero fue detenido de todos modos. Dijo que los controladores incorrectamente recitan el alfabeto, utilizaban armas para equilibrio e incoherentemente discurso - cuando el video mostró correctos alfabetos, equilibrio perfecto y claro discurso.
Los registros muestran que sacó gente en paradas de DUI 17 veces mientras su crucero fue ocupada con otros presos. Es contra el procedimiento. Rutinariamente presentó informes de arresto días, incluso semanas, después de realizar un arresto. Le dijo a asuntos internos Detective Bruce Crumpler que siempre informó los resultados de pruebas de sobriedad de campo basados en memoria. ¿No dejar margen para errores, Crumpler preguntó? "Bueno, no hay margen para el error,"Brock dijo Crumpler."Nunca he tenido un problema." (Nota del editor: hasta ahora su trabajo no fue en la línea, no fue restringida su libertad y su licencia no estaba en peligro. No es extraño que nunca había tenido un problema.)
Su papeleo se convirtió en objeto de desprecio en la Oficina del fiscal del estado de Hillsborough, donde los fiscales dijeron que el diputado ha empañado su reputación mediante la presentación de informes de arresto inexacta que carecían de detalles importantes. "No tiene una muy buena reputación por ser un muy buen oficial de DUI que nos preocupamos de trabajar con," fiscal Jennifer Gabbard dijo a Crumpler."Es casi como lo que usted puede hacer para que luzca como está arrestando a gente."
Desde octubre de 2005 a octubre de 2006, Brock realizaron 313 detenciones por conducir bajo la influencia. Él no pudo activar el equipo de audio y vídeo de su crucero en 40 por ciento de sus paradas, en lugar de ello confía en su "memoria de forjado" importante recordar arresta detalles, mostró la auditoría. Dentro de la Oficina del Sheriff, Brock adjunto previamente había sido elogiado por su "destacado servicio profesional" y recomendó consistentemente aumentos. Sus superiores clasificaron su desempeño "satisfactorio" y lo llamaban un crédito a la Oficina. Él fue elogiado como un adjunto dedicado quien habló a los estudiantes de secundaria acerca de los peligros de conducir.
"Sentíamos siempre fue un buen oficial," dijo Becky Gage, 55, el abogado de la víctima para el capítulo de MADD de Hillsborough.Como oficiales están dentro del alcance de la ley, entonces apoyamos sus esfuerzos para quitar controladores de deteriorados". (Nota del editor: liderazgo de MADD abraza un estándar de "tolerancia cero" para todos, por lo que ellos creen que una persona que bebía una cerveza en un juego de pelota debe ser detenido.)
Sin embargo, el ex diputado encontró unos baches de la carretera. Fue suspendido y enviado a la escuela de manejo en 2000 después de una cadena de lo que la Oficina del Sheriff considera que los accidentes de tránsito evitables. En 2006, fue nombrado en un pleito federal alegando que atacó físicamente a la madre de un adolescente arrestado en 2002. La mujer del Condado de Hillsborough, dijo Brock obligó a sí mismo en su casa, empujó a una esquina y le rociado con aerosol de pimienta. La demanda no se ha resuelta.
Durante la reciente investigación de asuntos internos, Brock negó tratando de aumentar la cantidad de reconocimiento personal. Era jueves claro si Brock pretende apelar su despido. Le dijo a los investigadores que les da la oportunidad, él realizaría sus paradas DUI del mismo modo. Brock dijo: "quiero decir, un mundo perfecto, necesitamos más diputados y menos personas."Posted byAlabamaDUIDefense.comat7:42 AM
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